| The Coming Global Knowledge Society: |
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How to Analyze and Shape Its Future?
| Author: | Peter H. Mettler |  |
| Rights sold: | foreign rights available in all languages | |
| Genre: | Science | |
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ON THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES Most often, social sciences are divided into sub-disciplines such as psychology, political science, law, economics, sociology, etc. The sub-disciplines themselves claim rather specific scientific territories of their own. Psychology tackles intra-personal and/or group-related problems, including pathologies (leaving sub-sub-disciplines like the psychology of languages or ethno-psychology apart). New problems stem in part from globalization or from other new surroundings people are forced to cope with daily. The situation in political science is similar: classical references like states or nations are rapidly losing substance and no replacement is visible (neither non-governmental organizations, transitional conglomerates nor political-economic unions such as the European Union are successful this respect). Law has lost older reference to legal principles and national law, whilst matters of power gain importance and bridge over to political sciences as well as to economics, so legitimacy will have to be redefined. States as well as military powers have lost influence to economic power (historically, the legitimacy of wars and military interventions were already disputed quite vividly), “national economy“ has ceased to be regarded as serious science. We do not have serious theories an either world finances or economy in sociology, and there aren’t any more bold theoreticians around (like communistic ideologists, trying to explain the world, or phenomenologists and existentialists, etc.). While empirically working single-track sociologists dominate, meso-level theories on development of third world countries are denounced as speculative or not at all well-based. At least two exceptions have to be mentioned, since they stick to the necessity of analyzing bigger units ant not shying away from abstract theorizing: the Frankfurt School (Critical Theory) as well as certain types of Systems Analysis (but definitively not Luhmann). For example, “Which is the status of economic theory within the present Critical Theory?” or “Do macro-level analyses contribute to topics like Conflicts in World Order and the Global Civil Society?“ These types of approaches try to bring together as many of the mentioned sub-disciplines as possible. In the past, “world models“ were those that gained most attention (e.g., “Limits of Growth“). INCIDENCES Which are the incentives for this paper? Questions like “What were the reasons for the Kosovo war?“3, “Why was the OSCE ineffective?“ “Why do Europeans continue to be unable to form common opinions in certain policy areas and take respective actions?“ or “Does the United States really need a new enemy (like China or Islam)?“ Most decisive were the many negative consequences of globalization (and how to multiply the positive ones as well) and questions concerning capacities to shape the future. Some of the scientific attempts providing guidance to answer such questions should be called “Societal Science“ in my mind. Put differently: the greatest difficulties arise when trying to give answers to the question, “What are sciences like social sciences for?” The value of studies such as the following: “x% of all families buy y% of this product” is ambiguous and the “flair of irrelevance“ never too far. And social scientists have barely contributed to the formulation, propagation and justification of respective policies, rises in GPD or export successes. Certainly, individual researchers in individual countries have done so, but the science has barely gained reputation in that respect. Nevertheless, we place different emphasis when trying to answer questions such as “what is the utility of the societal sciences?“ In which domains of reality do they have only supplementary character and in which others would they be able to deliver original contributions (or have already done so)? Before we continue, let’s look at some shortcomings of the classical social sciences: the plethora of new social phenomena were never really perceived, and consequently have never been reported nor given causal explanations (except preliminary ones), or early warnings. Here are some examples: • The speedy rise (and eventual later break-down) of some former third world countries or societies such as the Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC); • The break-down of communism and right-wing dictatorships in many different regions of our globe (Africa, Asia, Latin America, but Europe as well). This often took place in parallel with the rise of new dictatorships, e.g., on the basis of religious fanaticisms; • In many industrialized countries, former leading social strata, which had once built up these countries/societies to a considerable degree, virtually eliminated themselves from power because they did not want to take into ac count phenomena such as “new internationally ruling classes and their ideologies, customs meeting points,“ etc.; • New super-urgent information for broadest social strata, as e.g., job opportunities, pensions or assurances (life, job and health), etc. These shortcomings were probably rooted in the fact that the social sciences were predominantly focused on national societies and only expected to give phenomenological explanations, whilst the new phenomena cannot be explained by research methods developed for those former tasks. In particular, temporal (long-range), geographical, economic and power problems are out of reach of such “tools“ and transcultural problems are global scientific and technological developments beyond the reach of their epistemology. We witness new revolutions as well as new types of revolutions: • “Economy dominates politics as never before.“ This type of revolutionary revolutionary societies. • ICT-based industry is one factor of the present Kondratieff-cycle out of two (it’s products are manufactured entirely with ever higher productivity by intelligent robots and transfer streets, rendering increasing percentages of labor useless); the other factor concerns the consequences of these products till the end of their life-time, once put to work. • This new-revolutionary society is already or will soon be entirely beyond nation states. But the nation state will not lose its functions completely. Wars will also be different: their goal will be neither the killing of soldiers nor the destruction of armament (or the destruction of industries which built them), but to stop the functioning of knowledge-bases and of institutions for the development of science and technology. Fore sure, these new-revolutionary societies are like Pandora’s boxes. But the anxieties caused by this insecurity might prevent these societies from following any prototype: they might develop into even more new-revolutionary societies or into societies of compromises that we cannot even have the faintest ideas about today. Finally we should remember the example of the “Pugwash“movement, even if most of its members were natural scientists at the outset: they acted in ways social scientists should have acted as the OSCE acted when trying to reduce the East-West tensions during the Cold War, in particular their theory (and practice) of “confidencebuilding.“ The question is did society profit from the application of social sciences to new technologies, work and leisure conditions or pension systems, etc., and, in particular, in respect to future developments? Or, and in order to reiterate our basic question: what profit did the application of social sciences yield during or after the end of the Kosovo war? TODAY’S REALITY AND A SCENARIO“Reality Is Not What It Used To Be“ — W.T. Anderson In order to be able to answer the question, as to which science/scientific method is most ideally suited to analyze today’s situation, at least some basic knowledge of today is required. But wouldn’t just that description of today’s situation already necessitate that very method? This simply ends up in one of those famous vicious scientific circles which more often than not proved verbal fallacies. My conviction is quite the opposite today’s reality can be recognized and described in its general directions, even if some details are missing; strong trend-indicators are pointing to its discontinuity like a necessity, and speculations on time-wise near societal features might be plausible for more distant features. Revolutionary changes will most probably increase and lost of chaotic situations as well, with exponential loss of power of nation states and simultaneous gain of power by Trans-National Conglomerates (TNC). The art of creating big units and global players9 will eventually decisive for our future (or how to avoid them intelligently without too many — negative — repercussions). Factors such as state, ideology and military lose their importance almost everywhere. Globalized entities (global players) do have inclinations to imperialistic behavior and also China, already amongst the global players, turns more and more imperialistic. Simultaneously, almost all Asia steps up its military, South-East Asia in particular. In order to be able to design an scenario, one has to, first of all, come to an message is communicated via revolutionary channels which operate by agreement on the time distance from today. Let’s say 2030 and 2070, since we have to realize that descriptions of situations can’t really mirror dynamic trend since theyare, by necessity, basically static, whist two scenarios with different temporalities arethe easiest possibility to describe dynamics. Aren’t 30 and 40 years too much; aren’t periods of this length too long? The best hint in that respect points to the fact that, on the one hand, we are constantly increasing our speed of change, whilst, on the other, the planning and realization periods of our ever bigger projects and programs also increase steadily. Two examples: a) life expectancy, and that means pension time, i.e., the time without work, has steadily increased and continues to do so; b) planning for the new high-speed railway track Colonge to Frankfurt-Airport started more than 12 years before its inauguration, the actual construction work took about ten years, and it is expected to serve at least 50 years. In appendix I will introduce the scenario, “2070 — A Little More Than Hope.“ For the present context, I refer to this scenario, in as far as present trends are interpreted, because the globe reaches in it almost a suicide-doomsday till 2030 but, because of awareness that it is five minutes before twelve, reorients itself till it reaches the described “situation 2070”. Those who want to influence today’s trends, those who want to reach the turn-around before 2030 or want to attain a different setting in 2070 (or follow even completely different goals) — they all will have to lay out how they intend to do it, or with what types of “instruments“. PRECONDITIONS FOR SOCIETAL SCIENCE, SINE QUA NON FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE OF THE COMING GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY The most important necessity for today, as well as for all futures, is the reconciliation of the imaginable with the possible and also with the desirable. That, quite sure, is normative and I want to state my conviction right away: social sciences have to accept that their loss of importance stems from the almost complete failure of their attempt to abandon all other approaches but the one of the natural sciences and from their postulate of necessary and possible value-freeness. Methodology was respected as extremely complex (mental acrobatics) in former times, but the glory has faded. Though it is true, on the one side, that day-to-day research in the social sciences stepped up its degree of complexity, it has lowered its requirements, on the other side, by abandoning its philosophical-ethical, partially even crypto-religious as well as ideological and worshiping parts. One methodology in particular has to be denounced right away, quite openly and most strongly: liberalism! Every research on liberalism proves that its main characteristic is anarchism. That’s why “Anarcho-Liberalism“ would be the exact description of today — at least of today’s style of economy, if not for most other spheres of life as well, sciences included. Liberal political parties are losing more and more ground today because they define their policy merely as economic liberalism instead of standing up for the right of each and every individual (i.e., for “all“ rights, not only for the one of business alone); and societies fostering liberalism too much find themselves deprived of inner solidarity. The first counter-movements against anarcho-liberalism and their spearheads (like TNCs and their CEOs), are already well under way. The turn-down of the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment) was the first lesson that even their power has limits. Revolts against mega-structures have never been interested in philosophical disputes about methodology. But liberalism’s ”methods” don’t really have to be analyzed in view of the real changes, e.g., in the Third World or in the environment. They are clear, straightforward and mono-goal oriented. These changes took place in the last decades and the globally acting liberalism (“globalization“) is the very reason for the tendencies toward catastrophes. revolutionary technologies and might end up, via revolutionary synergies, in "The spectrum of urgently necessary research for today and for the future" is not at all exclusive. It should much rather be understood as exemplary and will probably lend itself to be regarded as being very ambitious because of its societal science approach. None of the research requires specific knowledge and/or know-how “sine qua non” from “the futurologist with societal specialization,“ despite that profound knowledge of many fields never does any harm. The very specialization of the societal scientist as well as what he can offer to interdisciplinary teams is his knowledge and/or know-how in inter- and trans-disciplinary societal analyses with future orientation: • Science and technology futures, in particular in areas such as telematics, transportation and medicine (“biological engineering“) as well as in such sub-disciplines as technology and environmental assessment, sustain-ability and technology-transfer (between industrialized countries as well as from them to others); • political futures, in particular of the North American free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and of the European Union (EU), or of a prospective Trans-Atlantic-Union as a result of a closer going-together of the two former ones; but also the future of the identities of the triad and of Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC) and developing countries; • Economic futures, in particular of TNCs and global players, but possible futures of the globalization of agriculture and food and of world trade as well. It may be that the following future is only a dream: “Regions of the size of up to 20 million people, completely self-determining and economically almost self-sufficient (raw materials, production, consumption as well as waste treatment), are heavily networking globally in respect to science, knowledge and know-how , with strong feelings of responsibility for future generations as well as to help develop less developed regions. They simulate a completely new type of preparations for decision making for less developed regions. Global players still exist, but their might and influence is balanced by countervailing forces of regional networks and they are such more democracy-minded then in previous periods (they voluntarily take part in, e.g., Delphi studies with the goal to develop prototype visions)“; • Social futures, e.g., wealth-distribution, life-expectancy and population policy, as well as future studies in leisure, sport, professional activities, etc.; • Cultural futures, in particular the dialectics between individual and (world) society, as well as future studies on values, tolerance, morality or criminality; • Urban futures, in particular of megapols, as well as questions such as: “Would megapols be capable of forming countervailing forces to TNCs? “And/or: Would they be developing into a fourth political power besides the UN, nation-states and global-economy-players?; • Security futures, e.g., how the military and the armament industry, the technology of ABC weapons and their international proscription, the aerospace industry or SDI/NMD might develop; • Ecological futures, in particular man-made climate changes, weather • An finally the question, how a decline of world population to 5 billion people could come about by 2150? Should one want to describe researchers in societal science or qualifications they should have, two seem to be preeminent: 1. They ought to have learned how to move intra-culturally, e.g., between Europe and the Ex-Soviet-Union, the US and the Muslim World, between America and China, etc.; 2. Societal long-range planning and futures research ought to incorporate the following: • Futures research has to find ways, as do ecology, economy, politics, science and technology, to cope with the dialectic between local and global. Today this requires quite different and much lager research networks than exist so far; in particular, they have to be able to work empirically and be critical and hermeneutical as well. These networks have to be situated at the cross roads between researchers in the societal sciences and their institutes in the various countries of the world and MNCs, the UN and its agencies and all of the other global players (e.g., the megapol-network); • Futures research has to ask: which scaling down or even better extinctions of conflicts could become possible in the future between which situation, problems and relationships? One of the most appropriate examples is the high probability that our globe will be partitioned into only five blocks by 2070. We can only hope that they will be willing and able to settle problems between themselves peacefully; • Futures researchers have to have, first of all, very good knowledge of several languages, lived considerable amounts of time in several cultures and traveled extensively (the media does not really teach a great deal). Secondly, they have to have an almost encyclopedic knowledge in areas as far apart as natural and cultural sciences, medicine. technology and esoteric, etc. (“Knowledge Society!“) Thirdly, they have to strive for peace worldwide, be ready to get engaged for social and environmental balance and justice, be auto-critical and almost truth-maniacs. In a way, they have to neutralize as well as to supplement their homologous formed by the global players, the “worldcitizens of the transnational class,“ whose children will follow, think and feel the same and enlarge their group; • There is no patent on how to develop into an “expert in future-oriented societal science.“ Probably the best training is “on the spot“ after at least, e.g., two academic and one professional career (engineer and psychologist or medical doctor and political scientist, etc.). CONCLUSION There aren’t any certainties that the coming Global Knowledge Society will have human and social inclinations. If we want to make sure that human and social orientations dominate future developments or societies, we have to make sure to have appropriate research tools, available, now and in the near as well as in the far out future. They have to be as varied and flexible as all potential future phenomena, new forma of intelligence (which might entirely be machine-based or within Cyborgs, etc.) included. doomsdays, water shortages and genetic manipulations in respect to agriculture and food as well as to humans; |
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